PromptFenceControl Room →
A security control layer for AI agentsAllowDenyApproval

AI can reason.
PromptFence decides.

A security control layer between AI agents and the actions they are allowed to take. The model proposes. Policy decides. The tool only runs when it should.

Decision streamdemo data
  1. #400refund()₹9,000Allow
  2. #401refund()₹4,500Allow
  3. #402refund()₹7,200Allow
  4. #403refund()₹2,800Allow
  5. #404refund()₹42,000Approval
  6. #405refund()₹6,100Allow
  7. #406refund()₹9,000Allow
  8. #407refund()₹80,000Allow
  9. #408refund()₹7,200Allow
  10. #409refund()₹2,800Allow
The problem

AI used to answer.Now it acts.

refund_orderReal tool call

A refund can actually happen.

Each of these is a real tool call with a real consequence. The model can reason its way to any of them. Reasoning is not authorization.

Who decides?
The systemFollowing request #40

One request.
Five layers.
One decision.

Every action an agent wants to take passes through the same path. The agent never talks to the tool. It talks to the fence. Scroll to follow one request through.

Strands · Bedrock
AI agent
agent
support-agent
intent
refund
amount
₹9,000
customer
#4474
Intercept
PromptFence
event
Request received
request
#40
ts
14:02:31.114
tool call
Held
Policy
Cedar
policy
cumulative-refund-ceiling-v1
rule
forbid if total + amount > limit
limit
₹3,55,000
DynamoDB
Session context
session
CUST-4474
previous_total
₹3,51,000
prior requests
39 allowed
projected
₹3,60,000
Output
Decision
decision
Deny
reason
Cumulative session limit exceeded
approval path
not applicable
refund()
Real tool
execution
Not called
side effects
none
attack
stopped at the fence
Sequence-aware authorizationReady

One request
looks fine.

Forty requests tell
a different story.
Requests · support-agent#CUST-4474
Real tool · refund()Executed 0
Awaiting requests
Session total
₹0
Policy limit
₹3,55,000
Request
₹9,000
Decision
—
Run attack simulationDemo data · 40 requests · ₹9,000 each
Three decisionsHover or tap a path

Every request
ends one of
three ways.

refund()
₹9,000 · #4474
Allow
Real tool
executed
refund()
₹9,000 · #40
Deny
Stop
tool not called
refund()
₹42,000 · #4474
Approval
Human
approve · deny

One fence, three outcomes. Allowed requests cross to the real tool. Denied requests stop at the boundary and the tool is never called. Requests that need a person wait at the fence until a human approves or denies.

ArchitectureOnly the services we run

Runs on AWS.
One path.
No bypass.

01Strands + BedrockAgent runtime
02API GatewayEvery tool call enters
03LambdaRuns the fence
04PromptFenceAllow · Deny · Approval
Cedarpolicy evaluation
DynamoDBsession context
EventBridgedecision events
05Real toolCalled only on Allow
The tool never ran

The most important call
was the one
we didn’t make.